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Abstract 
This article uses the case study of Internet Protocol (IP) delivery for streaming 
television to demonstrate how technology and globalization combine to change what 
media firms do, how they create value, and with whom. Media delivery - the sum of the 
value-adding tasks necessary to transfer content from source to audience - has become a 
mosaic of technologies that sustain a complex and fast-evolving video ecosystem. 
Broadcasters had been in charge of the full transmission process once, of tasks deemed 
core to their business. Today, media delivery is externalized to the market and devolved 
to a network of suppliers. These suppliers are no ordinary firms, but tech giants that 
have developed deep global capabilities. They gain further leverage by being cross-
sectoral, serving clients across multiple industries. Who are these suppliers? What 
makes them unique? And what are the implications for the television industry?  
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Introduction: Thinking through  media globalization 
We are accustomed to thinking about media globalization, analysing the cultural and 
political implications of large-scale conglomeration (e.g. Herman and McChesney, 
1997). The aim of this research is to think it through. How does media globalization 
work? Which dynamics does it bring into play and how do they re-shape the industry? 
This article uses the case study of Internet Protocol (IP) delivery for streaming 
television to demonstrate how technology and globalization combine to change what 
media firms do, how they create value, and with whom.  
Media delivery - the sum of the value-adding tasks necessary to transfer content 
from source to audience - has become a mosaic of technologies that sustain a complex 
and fast-evolving video ecosystem. Broadcasters had been in charge of the full 
transmission process once, of tasks deemed core to their business. Today, media 
delivery is externalized to the market and devolved to a network of suppliers that 
collaborate along the value chain. These suppliers are no ordinary firms, but tech giants 
that have developed deep global capabilities and can leverage an unprecedented 
infrastructure to deliver content to and from (almost) any location in the world. They 
gain further leverage by being cross-sectoral, serving clients across multiple industries. 
This research identifies these suppliers, analyses their key features, and evaluates the 
implications for the television industry.  
The article is set out in the following manner. First, it compares and contrasts old 
and new media delivery mechanisms, analysing each segment of the current media 
delivery chain to provide an overview of the IP-driven video ecosystem. Next, it 
introduces the concepts of global value chain (GVC) and global suppliers, identifying 
those operating in media delivery.  It follows with an analysis of the evolving firm 
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boundaries and the links between businesses in the media delivery GVC. The final 
section demonstrates that the rise of global suppliers is furthering the global integration 
of the sector and facilitates industry co-evolution through the formation of a supply base 
that is shared among several industries. 
This evolution matters because it is changing both the structure and nature of the 
television industry. Some broadcasters, such as NBC in the USA or the BBC in the UK, 
were at the forefront of developments in broadcast engineering. They built and designed 
their own broadcast infrastructure. Today, whilst retaining a certain amount of 
technological expertise they increasingly outsource media delivery tasks and rely upon 
the infrastructure of tech giants. Engineering was once a part of broadcasters’ corporate 
identity but traditional broadcasting has had to ‘pivot away from what’s been an 
engineering-led activity’ (Greenaway, interview 2019), to redefine the contours of 
organizations and sometimes form larger entities (as illustrated, among others, by the 
acquisition of NBC Universal by Comcast) (Crawford, 2013).   
Television used to be akin to the Galàpagos Islands: a self-reliant engineering 
ecosystem that was distinct and separate from other industries. Today, it shares 
technology, transmission infrastructure, and suppliers, with other industries. This new 
dependency curtails the autonomy of the TV industry, and represents a power shift, this 
research will argue, between media firms and the new class of global suppliers they rely 
on. Furthermore, the size asymmetry between the former and the latter make it difficult 
- if not impossible - for media firms to grow and compete effectively with those tech 
giants that have entered the video market. 
This research uses global value chain (GVC) theory and methodology in order to 
understand the nature and implications of this evolution (Gereffi, 2011; Gereffi and 
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Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Gereffi et al., 2005). GVC analysts have an established track 
record in unpacking power relations between lead firms and their suppliers. This article 
will focus on the concepts of global suppliers and shared supply base, which will be 
applied for the first time in the context of the media industries. While fieldwork was 
primarily conducted in the UK, the GVC framework is inherently holistic and multi-
scalar, and is commonly applied to analyse the transnational production networks that 
structure the world political economy (Gereffi, 2014). As GVC research develops in the 
media industries, the same outlook can be applied to different geographies.  
From a methodological standpoint, this research relies on fieldwork conducted 
between 2017 and 2019, using British broadcasters as a case study. In line with GVC 
research, data was gathered from multiple sources, including industry reports, trade 
publications and webinars, and face-to-face interviews. This research also benefits from 
informal conversations with industry executives and one of the co-author’s extensive 
field experience.1 
 
The past and present of media delivery 
Since the origins of sound broadcasting, and for the greater part of the 20th century, 
media delivery consisted of the analogue transmission of a signal from a broadcasting 
facility to listeners’ and viewers’ radio and TV sets. It was a task broadcasters carried 
out themselves. In the UK, the BBC was in charge of the entire transmission process 
and developed its own network of transmitting stations (Briggs, 1995: 225-8, 997). 
Engineering skills and prowess was at the heart of the Corporation’s identity, which 
evolved into a world-leading institution in the field of broadcast engineering. The long 
list of innovations attributed to the BBC includes the first TV standards converter, the 
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first electronic recording apparatus and the first transatlantic transmission in the 1950s 
(BBC, 2017).  Between the 1920s and the 1970s, some 350 patents were issued to the 
BBC, that it used and licenced to manufacturers (Pawley, 1972: 528). When ITV joined 
the fray in 1955 it, too, equipped itself with a substantial engineering department in 
order to surmount the numerous technical challenges the newcomer faced (Stevens, 
interview 2017; Sendall, 1983: 324-9).2 
The media delivery these broadcasters established can be characterized by four key 
attributes. It was unimodal because broadcasters dealt with a single (terrestrial) 
transmission path. It was proprietary, as they operated their own hardware-centric 
infrastructure for the sole purpose of transmitting their channels. Even though the BBC 
and ITV would eventually share some transmission stations, each operated their own 
network (Sendall, 1983: 2).  
Media delivery was vertically integrated because it was a task that broadcasters 
carried themselves and were equipped to do. Although British broadcasters have always 
collaborated with equipment suppliers, these arrangements were related to specialized 
processes and they remained in charge of the entire operation.  
Finally, the transmission of TV signals was strictly national; broadcasters had no 
business beyond their borders and European countries prohibited foreign TV signals. As 
a reflection of the national nature of broadcasting, broadcasters’ transmission facilities 
followed the contours of national territory and never ventured beyond (e.g. Reith, 1924: 
15; Scannel, 1996). 
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The Advent of IP Delivery  
Media delivery was changing and progressing well before the Internet became a vehicle 
for video distribution. The number of transmission paths increased with the emergence 
of cable and communication satellites. Yet, these two means of transmission were to 
remain at the fringes of the TV industry until a breakthrough in signal compression was 
achieved through advancements in digital technologies (Starks, 2013). With the 
capability to package more channels in the same bandwidth, pay-TV platforms could 
offer more choice, which made their product considerably more attractive to consumers. 
Sky, for instance, Europe’s foremost satellite broadcaster, began trading in the UK in 
1989 with four channels transmitted to a few thousand subscribers. Sky Digital, by way 
of contrast, broadcast hundreds of channels to millions of customers by the 2000s 
(Horsman, 1997).  
Videocassette recorders (VCRs), and later digital video recorders (DVRs), were the 
first ‘time-shifting’ technologies. Cable providers invented Video on Demand (VoD). 
They first delivered ‘near VoD’ by providing content carousels where films started 
every 20 minutes, and then offered true VoD when capacity increased. Even though IP 
delivery followed an evolution, it remains a game changer. IP transport not only 
comprehensively changed media delivery, it transformed business models and brought 
about a new video ecosystem that far exceeds, both in terms of volume and complexity, 
the broadcasting ecology of the recent past.  
The complexity stems from several factors. First, video originators have multiplied 
and include the VoD offerings of broadcasters and pay-TV providers, social media 
networks (e.g. Facebook Watch or Snapchat), video-sharing apps and platforms (such as 
YouTube, Twitch or Line Live), and the direct-to-consumer (DTC) platforms of tech 
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and media conglomerates (Amazon Prime Video, Apple TV+, Disney+, AT&T’s HBO 
Max, etc.) (Cunningham and Craig, 2019; Rein and Venturini, 2018; Spilker, Ask and 
Hansen, 2018). There is also a growing variety of rights holders from sports leagues to 
news organizations with their own video-enabled websites. Video-sharing alone lends 
itself to several applications, such as live streaming (widely used by the popular video-
game oriented streaming websites), transactional VoD and TV channel distribution 
(Fontaine et al, 2018). 
Furthermore, VoD is a 24/7 universe where users expect to stream or download 
programming anytime and anywhere, regardless of whether in a fixed location or on the 
move. The devices used to access content are increasingly disparate, ranging from 
mobile phones and tablets to game consoles and ultra-high-definition 105-inch TV 
screens. Finally, audiences are more fragmented and dispersed than in the past. 
Transnational TV networks such as CNN, Discovery or Disney, and entertainment 
platforms, need to reach viewers across borders. Even national broadcasters, which had 
one feed per channel in the analogue era, now air multiple regional and sub-regional 
feeds in order to accommodate local taste and needs (Chalaby, 2019).  
This ecosystem is experiencing dramatic growth driven by the surge in VoD 
consumption. In the UK for instance, the percentage of households with subscriptions to 
a VoD service has risen from 14 per cent in 2014 to 47 per cent in 2019 (among whom 
an increasing number subscribe to more than one) (Ofcom, 2019: 59).  Non-broadcast 
content makes up 31 per cent of total video consumption (an average of 59.5 minutes 
per day/user), and 58 per cent of the total viewing time of 16-34 year olds (averaging at 
2 hours and 39 minutes per day) (Ofcom, 2019: 4-5). In this age group, YouTube alone 
is viewed 64 minutes per day (Ofcom, 2019: 5).   
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This consumption is reflected in Internet traffic data. Video applications constitute 
the largest part of total Internet traffic, growing faster than any other. In 2017,  IP video 
traffic accounted for 75 per cent of total IP traffic, and this percentage is set to rise to 82 
per cent by 2022, ‘when the amount of VoD traffic will be equivalent to 10 billion 
DVDs per month’ (Cisco, 2018: 2). Much of the forecast growth in IP traffic, from 
46,600 GB per second in 2017 to 105,700 GB per second in 2022 is attributable to 
video applications (Cisco, 2018: 5). 
 
 Attributes of Media delivery 2.0 
This video environment could not exist without an intricate and efficient media delivery 
chain, which bears little in common with the old one. In contemporary terms, media 
delivery starts when content creators have delivered the master tape and aggregators 
(broadcasters and platforms) package it up in order to reach various audiences. The 
chain’s key segments are publication, transmission and reception (Chalaby, 2019). 
Publication involves the preparation and conversion of files into various formats for 
transmission, which begins when a signal/file is sent out from the playout system. 
Transmission paths vary: signals sent to pay-TV platforms and international channels 
will be delivered through fiber optic cables and/or communications satelllites, while 
files for streaming services will be distributed via the open Internet and content delivery 
networks (CDNs) (below). 
The way media delivery is handled today differs vastly from that of the past. The 
attributes of the new delivery chain contrast with the old ones and help explains the vast 
changes that are affecting the television industry (Table 1). The contemporary media 
delivery chain is best described as multimodal. Broadcasters and media conglomerates 
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that operate both TV channels and on-demand platforms have to deal with two distinct 
sets of transmission protocols. In a classic broadcast transmission path – or multicast – a 
single piece of content is transmitted over a radio wave; there is only one copy at any 
time (and frequency), which is shared by all the recipients. Even in this configuration, 
though, the transmission paths vary between cable, satellite and terrestrial. The second 
transmission mechanism – unicast – runs over IP and is used by all over-the-top (OTT) 
media services.3 In the unicast model every single stream is a unique copy, and if a 
million viewers watch the same show, it means that a million copies are being viewed 
simultaneously. This transmission protocol is a pull mechanism, as viewers request their 
own copy of the material, in opposition to the push structure of the broadcast path.  
There are two distinct classes of OTT delivery – VoD and live streaming. On-
demand content is watched at the time and place of the viewers choosing and consists of 
catalogues of movies and TV shows such as those made available in major subscription 
services, or ‘catch-up’ content with shorter rights windows on traditional broadcaster 
platforms (e.g. BBC’s iPlayer). 
Live streaming content is event-driven programming such as live sports and news. 
While both on-demand and live streaming content is carried across OTT networks, the 
live streaming use case has particularly stringent latency requirements. Audiences 
expect live action content to be delivered in near or real-time so the content publication 
and transmission paths must be optimised to make this possible. Live streaming content 
of the most popular events presents another challenge – that of concurrency and scale. 
This results in significantly different approaches to encoding and transport optimisation 
of OTT content depending on whether its VoD or live streaming. However, as live 
streamed content is often tomorrow’s on-demand content (as when a sports event 
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becomes available on a catch-up service), there is often an additional live-to-VoD phase 
where the content encoding and packaging is converted from one use case to the other. 
 
Table 1: Media delivery (past and present) 
Former media delivery 
(1920s – 1990s) 
unimodal proprietary national vertically integrated 
Media delivery 2.0 multimodal Open/standardized global Segmented/disintegrated 
Source: authors 
 
Broadcast networks used to be proprietary in the sense that they were owned by a 
single operator which used them for the sole purpose of transmitting TV channels. As a 
consequence, broadcasting developed as a separate ecosystem akin to the Galàpagos 
Islands: the industry developed its own infrastructure for connectivity and transport with 
its own cables, ports, switches, together with its own vocabulary and set of 
terminologies. With the transition to IP delivery, broadcasting is embracing the common 
IT stack and sharing technologies and equipment with other industries. When broadcast 
engineers procure equipment, they only purchase the upper level broadcast-specific 
application, not the entire physical device. Apart from the specialist applications, the 
hardware, the operating systems and the rest of the IT stack are all generic.  
Third, the geographical scope of media delivery has changed. As seen, transmission 
networks delineated the contours of nations to ensure the whole population had access 
to the same programmes – and only those. Today, media conglomerates, streaming 
services and most other video aggregators aim to reach audiences across borders. It is a 
myth that entertainment platforms are born global but compared to the transnational TV 
networks that preceded them (Chalaby, 2005, 2009), they internationalize very rapidly. 
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The flag-bearer, Netflix, launched streaming content for US customers in 2007. Twelve 
years later, it was present in 190 countries and had more subscribers outside its home 
market than within (99.4 million versus 67.7 million subscribers for a total of 167.1 
million members) (Netflix, 2020). Apple TV+ and Disney+ both launched in November 
2019, the former in over 100 territories and the latter in five key markets (Australia, 
Canada, USA, the Netherlands, and New Zealand). Walt Disney needed time to retrieve 
the streaming rights it had sold to third parties before spreading its DTC platform, but 
had already reached most of Western Europe by April 2020.  
Finally, media delivery is no longer a task that broadcasters do themselves a value 
chain that involves networks of collaborating firms. Broadcast vendors have long 
existed but broadcasters assumed the bulk of the work and remained in charge of the 
whole operation. Today, the trend is towards outsourcing. In the UK, broadcasters no 
longer perform most media delivery activities. The BBC, ITV and Channel 4, among 
others, began contracting out media delivery in the 2000s (Chalaby, 2019). Broadcasters 
encountered the same set of issues: the transition to high definition (HD), the growth of 
non-linear services, the need to automate broadcast services and playout, each required 
heavy investment. Sinead Greenaway, UKTV’s chief technology officer, remembers: 
‘every time a new platform arrived we’d just build another workflow, so it’s completely 
inefficient’ (Greenaway, interview 2019). Faced with an increasingly complex, 
expanding and fast evolving set of technologies, British-based terrestrial broadcasters 
came to a tipping point and reached the conclusion that it would be more efficient and 
less costly to devolve media delivery to specialist providers. Shane Tucker, Channel 4’s 
broadcast engineering officer, recalls: 
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I think our CFO made the decision at the time and it was purely based on cost and efficiencies. 
Channel 4 was about to launch a HD channel when we were negotiating and that was basically one 
of the drivers. All the investment to upgrade our entire infrastructure to be HD would cost us x 
amount and then they thought, actually we could outsource the entire operation, and that was the 
driving force really (Tucker, interview 2017). 
 
The remainder of this research focuses on the scale and scope of these suppliers, 
and the implications for television industry.  
 
Standing on the shoulders of giants: GVCs and their global suppliers 
 The objective of this section is twofold. First, it places the evolution of television in the 
wider economic context. Although every industry has its own particularities, they all 
must adapt to a rapidly changing world political economy. Responding to the 
affordances of contemporary capitalism, many industrial sectors have globalized and 
reorganized into GVCs, or transnational networks of production with a system of 
governance coordinating internationally dispersed firms and activities (Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016).  GVCs entail a 
distinction between lead firms and suppliers, even though the nature of their relationship 
changes from one sector to another (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005). The 
scope of suppliers can also vary, and the most advanced GVCs have witnessed the rise 
of suppliers with global capabilities. This research identifies and analyses those 
operating in the media delivery chain. Such work has never been conducted in the 
context of the media industries, so a second objective is to introduce the concept of 
global supplier, operating under the premise that the characteristics of global suppliers, 
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as identified by GVC researchers, will be relevant to our purpose. 
In GVCs, goods and services flow along a chain made of segments that involve 
different sets of firms and activities. The segmentation of production processes and the 
specialization of firms within one segment are known to economists as the 
disintegration of production and vertical specialization (Feenstra, 1998; Langlois, 2003). 
The presence of such trends in the media, most notably the film industry, has already 
been identified. According to scholars, the de-verticalization of production processes 
started with the disintegration of studio film production, which occurred with the 
dismantling of the Hollywood Studio System (Caves, 2000: 87-102; Scott, 2005: 29, 
40). The ensuing transition to spot production produced ‘several observable changes in 
the film industry’s structure’ (Caves, 2000: 96), notably the emergence of specialist 
suppliers a more flexible production system, but also a more casual workforce (Caves, 
2000: 96-7, Scott, 2005: 120-1).  
 In a less dramatic - and perhaps less visible - manner, the TV industry went the 
same way a few decades later, as broadcasters (in Europe at least) outsourced a growing 
proportion of their programmes (Chalaby, 2016). By contracting out some of their 
activities, media firms have embraced a practice that is a common feature of global 
capitalism (Feenstra, 1998). In the past, large corporations were vertically integrated 
and sought to keep in-house as many tasks as possible, an organizational configuration 
known as the Chandlerian firm (Innomata, 2017: 18). The closing decades of the 20th 
century saw widespread economic liberalization and free trade agreements combine 
with rapid progress in transport (e.g. intermodal containers) and information and 
communications technologies, enabling multinationals to allocate activities in function 
of their varying costs in different territories. They found it more efficient to break up the 
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value chain and outsource - and often offshore - non-core activities. Today, many 
industries, from fashion to electronics, are dominated by ‘fabless manufacturers’ such as 
Nike or Dell that sell goods they do not manufacture (Grossman and Helpman, 2005; 
Langlois, 2003; Milberg and Winkler, 2013). Ardent outsourcers include Apple: the 
world’s first trillion-dollar company by market value owns no plant and offshores the 
entirety of its manufacturing operations to Asian subcontractors (Davies, 2018; Dedrick 
et al, 2010). 
As a result of the disintegration of production, Chandlerian industries characterized 
by large vertically integrated corporations have been progressively replaced by GVCs. 
The 2008/09 financial crisis proved to be a short-lived break in the momentum, and the 
fragmentation of production has since continued apace to expand in the world economy, 
representing a significant share of international trade (Timmer et al., 2014).   
GVCs have long been driven by Western-based multinationals such as retail chains 
and branded manufacturers that offshore production to networks of small and 
predominantly Asian suppliers (Frederick and Gereffi, 2011). But as outsourcing and 
offshoring grow, so too the suppliers. GVC researchers have observed ‘the rise of a 
global supply base populated by large, international, highly capable suppliers, contract 
manufacturers, intermediaries, and service providers, something unique in the history of 
the world economy’ (Sturgeon et al, 2011: 232). ‘A new class of huge global suppliers’ 
has emerged, they argue, made of manufacturing and trading companies ‘that no one 
has ever heard of’ but which have developed deep global capabilities (Sturgeon et al, 
2011: 235, 236). 
Such suppliers, this article contends, have emerged in television, and particularly in 
the media delivery chain. What make them distinctive, and what are their key 
 15 
characteristics? Answers are provided by GVC scholars, who have so far identified such 
suppliers in three industries: fashion (e.g. Li & Fung), electronics (e.g. Flex) and 
automotive (e.g. Valeo). First, they have a global footprint in terms of production and 
distribution coverage. For instance, Flex (formerly Flextronics), which is among the 
world’s largest electronic manufacturing service (EMS) companies, is supplier to many 
of the world’s most famous consumer electronics brands. It operates 137 centres for 
logistics, manufacturing, or research, across 27 countries (Flex, 2018; Sturgeon and 
Kawakami, 2010). Li & Fung’s extensive network of supply chains involves 17,000 
staff spread across 230 locations in 40 different territories (Li & Fung, 2019). 
Second, these firms are no longer mere ‘captive’ but full-fledged turnkey suppliers 
(Sturgeon and Lee, 2005: 41). They orchestrate entire supply chains, starting with 
product design, carrying into sourcing, manufacturing and packaging, and ending with 
global logistics and retail management (Sturgeon et al, 2011: 253).  
Finally, global suppliers are multi-sectoral and operate across several industrial 
sectors. Flex, for instance, has clients in 13 different industries from aerospace and 
defense to healthcare and consumer electronics (Flex, 2018). 
Global suppliers derive a competitive advantage from their scale and capabilities. To 
start with, only they can provide worldwide support to their clients. The lead firms they 
serve invariably operate in multiple markets and need manufacturing or logistics 
support irrespective of geography. For example, in the automotive industry, a braking 
system manufacturer is expected to install equipment in all the plants that its clients 
operate. As an automotive supplier explains: 
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Today it is a requirement to serve platforms – it is part of the bid. If a supplier doesn’t have a global 
strategy, it can’t bid. New projects are no longer seen as an opportunity to expand globally – instead, 
a supplier must have a global base in place to even make a bid (in Sturgeon and Florida, 2004: 69-
70).  
 
Global suppliers generate economies of scope, which they achieve by buying raw 
materials in bulk, manufacturing the same component on an unprecedented scale, or 
saving costs by switching production from one client or component to another in the 
same facilities (Sturgeon and Florida, 2004: 69). Substantial economies of scale are 
obtained by deploying generic assets and processes in manufacturing or logistics across 
their customer base (Sturgeon and Lee, 2005: 39-40). 
Contra expectations, global suppliers are agile and have the flexibility in their 
network of facilities to shift production between regions in adjustment to changing tax 
regimes and trade policies. For example, they can shift from global to local sourcing by 
moving production from Asia to North America should an American car manufacturer 
need to adapt to the current US administration’s raft of protectionist measures (Sturgeon 
and Florida, 2004: 68).  
Finally, multi-sectoral suppliers are in the unique and privileged position of being 
able to transfer knowledge across markets, clients and industries. Like Li & Fung, Flex 
operates across more than 1,000 supply chains, dealing with 30,000 suppliers in 35 
countries. As it solves issues that are specific to a sector, it gains knowledge that can be 
applied across others. In addition, the spread of these activities generates a wealth of 
data and feedback that give the business unique insights into trends ahead of industries 
and markets (Flex, 2018). This research will now argue that a similar type of suppliers 
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has emerged in the media delivery GVC. 
 
The rise of global suppliers in the media delivery GVC 
Neither 19th-century telegraph companies nor early 20th-century wireless operators (e.g. 
Marconi) matched the capabilities of today’s global and multi-sectoral suppliers 
(Raboy, 2016). The ability to operate an infrastructure on a global scale and deliver 
content anytime/anywhere on the planet came later. As TV networks began to 
internationalize in the 1980s they turned to the satellite industry for distribution. 
Satellite operators as suppliers with deep global capabilities were the precursors to a 
trend that has become prevalent. The growing preponderance of an IP-driven video 
transport environment has facilitated the emergence of global suppliers in two other 
areas of media delivery: content delivery networks (CDNs) and cloud computing.     
 
The Communications satellite operators 
The first communications satellites launched in the 1960s and most satellite operators 
had a national or regional remit. Intelsat was the exception, and the Washington-based 
organization was the first to achieve global coverage in 1969. Early communications 
satellites, however, were not designed to transmit TV signals (Labrador and Galace, 
2005: 49-58). Satellites could only be exploited commercially by TV stations later, and 
the first TV network to reach global distribution was CNN in 1989. The news network 
used satellites from various organizations, including the Soviet Union’s Intersputnik, to 
complete its coverage (Chalaby, 2009).  
Once private satellite operators were given freer rein by most governments, the 
industry went through several decades of growth and consolidation, to leave three 
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operators that fit the global supplier label: Intelsat, Eutelsat and the Société Européenne 
des Satellites (SES). As shown in Table 2, the satellite fleet, orbital positions, premium 
video neighbourhoods and ground facilities cover six continents and allow them to 
deliver content and bandwidth to and from virtually any location on the globe. SES, for 
instance, operates satellites from Europe to the South Pacific region, serving over 8,000 
TV channels to more than one billion people in 367 million homes (SES, 2020: 5). 
 
Table 2: communications satellite operators with global capabilities 
Operator 1st satellite 
(year 
launched) 
Headquarters Full-year 2019 
Revenue (US$ 
billion) 
Satellite fleet 
(number of 
spacecraft) 
Number of 
video 
neighbour-
hoods 
Number of TV 
channels 
transmitted 
SES 1988 Luxembourg 2.2 55 40 8,300 
Intelsat 1965 Luxembourg 2.1 54 37 5,087 
Eutelsat 1983 Paris 1.5 37 19 6,810 
Source: company sources. Date of exchange rate from € to US$: 10 June 2020. 
 
Today, these satellite operators’ client lists span several industries with global 
connectivity needs and include most of the world’s broadcasters and pay-TV platforms. 
They serve them in several capacities: transmission of their TV channels and direct 
distribution to households, delivery of live content such as major sports events and 
music festivals to viewers around the world, and connecting newsrooms to field 
reporters and other news organizations.  
 
The CDN industry  
The Internet backbone would not be able to cope with the current level of demand for 
video distribution, and CDNs have been built to carry the bulk of this traffic.  They 
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currently transport 56 per cent of total Internet traffic, and this percentage is forecast to 
reach 72 per cent by 2022 (Cisco, 2018: 3).  
A CDN is a worldwide network of servers whose role is to improve the speed and 
reliability of content delivery by storing content as close as possible to end users. When 
a user’s device sends a request for content, it is directed to the CDN’s nearest front-end 
(or edge) server. The CDN will recover the first request for a particular piece of content 
from the originator (origin server) and will then store a copy. Subsequent requests from 
the same location will no longer travel to origin but will be dealt with by the CDN’s 
front-end server. The second (and subsequent) request for Chilling Adventures of 
Sabrina from a London-based Netflix customer will no longer travel to California but 
will be routed to a data centre in London (Telehouse North in Docklands, in this 
instance). The CDN will replicate the operation as many times as necessary by storing 
content on its network of servers located at the edge of the Internet, as close as possible 
to where end users live.  
CDNs represent ‘a seismic shift in how the Internet is interconnected’ and their 
rapid deployment is down to the multiple benefits they offer (Stocker et al.: 2017: 4). 
CDNs are designed to answer the scale implications unicast create: by routing much of 
the traffic to the nearest Point of Presence (PoP), a CDN offloads an enormous amount 
of data onto local networks and enables the scaling of IP content distribution. By 
reducing travel between source and destination, CDNs help reduce latency (delay) and 
improve the viewing experience that is essential in the competitive world of VoD 
consumption. With no exception, all major video originators (even those with access to 
a proprietary network) have recourse to third party CDNs. In the media and 
entertainment sector, six providers control between half and three quarters of the market 
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(Table 3).   
Table 3: Global CDNs for the media & entertainment sector 
 Number of PoPs 
or servers 
Key media clients Notes 
Akamai 
Technologies 
285,000 servers, 
1,500 networks, 
136 countries 
‘29 of the top media and entertainment 
companies’ 
Industry pioneer; 
Acknowledged as the largest 
CDN 
CloudFront (AWS) 150+ PoPs (24 
regions, 61 
availability zones) 
Amazon Prime Video, Condé Nast Italia, 
Digital De Agostini (Italy), Discovery 
Communications, Hulu, M6 (France), 
PBS, Spotify, Seven Networks 
(Australia), Sony DADC, Spuul, TVNZ 
(New Zealand) 
Leveraging its parent 
company’s (Amazon) large 
infrastructure 
Limelight Networks 100+ PoPs BBC, Channel 4 (UK), Channel 5 (UK), 
Daily Motion, DirecTV, Echostar, 
Lionsgate, Marvel, Pluto TV, Pokémon, 
SKY 
An industry pioneer, founded 
in 2001 in Tempe, Arizona 
Verizon Digital 
Media Services 
130+  PoPs 
 
ABC, Al Jazeera, BBC, Canal +, CBS, 
Discovery, Disney, ESPN, HBO, MTV, 
NBC, Viacom, Warner Bros. Pictures 
Formely EdgeCast  Networks, 
acquired by Verizon in 2013 
Google Cloud CDN 140 PoPs, 22 
regional caches, 
200+ countries 
Cloud clients that may use CDN: 20th 
Century Fox, Bloomberg, King, Sky, 
Sony Music, Vimeo 
Powering YouTube 
Microsoft Azure 
CDN 
129 PoPs, 54 
regions, 140 
countries 
NBC Sports Recently launched, running at 
the edge of Microsoft’s global 
network 
Source: authors 
 
The CDN industry is highly concentrated because the need for scale - and the 
benefits that brings – creates high entry barriers to market. Although smaller CDNs can 
deploy mitigating strategies, 4 those with global scope have an in-built commercial and 
technological advantage. First, content owners request global coverage from their CDN 
providers. Yves Boudreau, VP of Partnerships and Ecosystem Strategy at Ericsson, 
explains: ‘When Fox goes and pays a global CDN to deliver its content, it pays a global 
CDN to deliver globally’ (Boudreau, 2017). Similar to automotive firms, media 
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conglomerates operate across geographies and demand adequate support from their 
suppliers, who hence need global capabilities to be in the market. In truth, no CDN 
covers the whole planet and content aggregators must turn to multiple providers. 
Despite its parent company’s remarkable infrastructure, Amazon Prime Video needs six 
networks, and although Netflix has built its own CDN (Netflix Open Connect), it uses a 
few others to reach its customers (Kilpatrick, interview 2019). In all cases, however, a 
global CDN constitutes the backbone of the distribution network.   
A second advantage of global CDNs is their elasticity, because of the ‘upside 
flexibility’ it allows (Sturgeon, 2002: 458): large providers can scale up capacity at 
short notice, ensuring they are able to fulfil any streaming demand, no matter how large. 
For Amazon Web Services (AWS), this includes European-wide streaming of the Six 
Nations Championship (rugby) and continent-wide coverage of the Indian Premier 
League (IPL, cricket). For the IPL, the Amazon subsidiary needs to cope with over 10 
million concurrent streams each night (Kilpatrick, interview 2019). 
This upside flexibility provides yet another incentive for media owners to contract 
out CDN deployment: they can upscale without capital investment because expenditure 
increases only as needs expand. And for the CDN providers spreading their own 
investment and cost across thousands of users, this expenditure represents a fraction of 
that involved in running a proprietary CDN. Being able to leverage scale, large CDN 
providers like Akamai are profitable, and the regional or national players (such as the 
main telcos eg. BT in the UK), can do well by bundling CDN services into their wider 
service portfolio. 
Furthermore, ‘distributing CDN servers over a wide geographic area expands the 
range of options for serving content from a server that is geographically close to the 
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end-user’ (Stocker et al., 2017:11). This wide range of options not only brings down 
latency (the CDN being closer to a greater number of users) but also increases resilience 
as traffic can be rerouted in case of any technical issue (outage, etc.) that can take a data 
centre out of action (Kilpatrick, interview 2019).   
The ability to leverage scale brings economic benefits.  Essentially, CDN providers 
sell a commodity – bandwidth - whose price, like oil, varies little globally. First and 
foremost, buyers consider cost per gigabyte, and global providers can leverage 
significant economies of scale. Because of the high volumes they are dealing with, they 
can lower the average costs on delivering data to reach a point beyond the minimum 
efficient scale of the long-run average cost curve, which smaller firms cannot do 
(Sloman et al., 2016: 155-7). In addition, as the ratio of fixed costs/variable costs is very 
high in the CDN industry, once the largest suppliers have invested in infrastructure the 
costs of adding features and clients is marginal, and having large numbers of clients 
brings costs down further. For instance, AWS was able to reduce prices over 60 times in 
the past five years (Darnell, interview 2019; Google executive, interview 2019; 
Kilpatrick, interview 2019). 
 
Cloud computing 
Cloud computing is an industry that is equally concentrated. Worldwide, the sector is 
dominated by five global suppliers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, 
Google Cloud Platform, Alibaba and IBM (Synergy, 2018). In addition to the benefits 
of consumption-based pricing, the elasticity, scalability, and overall performance of 
cloud services increasingly tilt the balance in their favour.  
AWS alone controls one third of the market, and the top three providers hold more 
 23 
than half the market in their hands (Panettieri, 2018). Furthermore, the growth rate of 
the top four providers exceeds that of the ‘small-to-medium sized cloud operators who 
collectively have seen their market share diminish’ (Synergy, 2018). In the media and 
entertainment sector, the market leader is undoubtedly AWS.  In EMEA alone, it serves 
in excess of 5,000 clients, including broadcasters, publishers, TV production and post-
production companies, visual effect houses, storage firms, analytics companies, digital 
distributors, digital advertisers and advertising agencies (Atkinson, 2017; Kilpatrick, 
interview 2019).  
Cloud computing plays an increasingly important role in media delivery, not least 
because of the growing prevalence of the OTT space. Internet-based applications 
encode, store, transfer, encrypt, and distribute files, support all asset management 
operations, and facilitate collaboration and editing through file sharing. Cloud 
computing is particularly useful for processing and analysing large bodies of viewing 
data.  
 Some media firms have invested in their own infrastructure but do-it-yourself data 
centres have a low utilization rate (circa 20 per cent), which has negative implications in 
terms of amortization and depreciation (Kilpatrick, interview 2019). As the industry’s 
leading survey shows (100,000 + responses worldwide), the favourite option is to 
externalize computing services and migrate workflows to the public cloud (computing 
services offered by third-party providers over the Internet) (Devoncroft, 2018). Most 
broadcasters in Europe and the USA are in the process of moving workflow to the 
cloud. In the UK, those broadcasters moving their streaming platforms include BBC 
(iPlayer), Channel 4 (All 4), and UKTV, as have Turner, Fox and Comcast in the USA. 
Discovery Networks has closed its own VoD operations and moved 300 TV channels 
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onto cloud, streaming them globally from North Virginia. Netflix uses a variety of 
CDNs to distribute its content (including Open Connect, its own distribution network), 
but for everything else, it is AWS. Netflix shut its last data centre in 2016 and ‘almost 
hundred percent of everything they do is on AWS’ (Kilpatrick, interview 2019).  
As with CDN, the upside flexibility and consumption-based pricing of cloud 
services enable media owners to scale up without capital investment. These services’ 
overall performance and resilience further tilt the balance in their favour. Microsoft 
Azure’s network, for instance, is split into 54 regions worldwide (e.g. Norway West, US 
Gov Arizona, Japan East), each region is divided into geographical availability zones, 
and each zone consists of multiple datacentres and thousands of servers which 
themselves sit on different power supplies. Microsoft has built the resilience of its 
network to the point where it can lose an entire availability zone to a catastrophic failure 
without any loss of performance (Darnell, interview 2019). 
Resilience alone is an important reason why a media owner like Netflix migrated to 
the cloud. When the website launched on 14 April 1998 as an online DVD rental store, 
it ‘crashed all day’ (Randolph, 2019: 112). The Santa Cruz-based start-up had no choice 
but to spend the little money it had on extra servers (Randoph, 2019: 112-16). The cost 
of financing and the complexity of running Netflix’s data centres was growing 
exponentially, not least when Netflix pivoted to streaming in 2007. Despite huge 
investment, the platform was not immune to problems. In 2008, a data centre failure 
shut its entire operation for three days, and the management ‘faced a choice: turn 
Netflix into a world-class data centre operations company or more the service to the 
public cloud’ (Macaulay, 2018). The company picked the right option, and not merely 
because of resilience: its growth and ever-increasing infrastructure needs could only be 
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met by a major cloud services provider.    
Concentration stems from the strong economies of scale that prevail in the cloud 
computing industry. Developing cloud infrastructure is capital intensive, and an 
availability zone alone can cost up US$4 billion (anonymous industry source). Once in 
place, this infrastructure needs to be amortized with the largest possible number of 
clients. Thus, large cloud providers are multi-sectoral and serve clients across industrial 
sectors. AWS, Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure have adopted a similar structure, 
whereby centralised product teams develop the applications that are used across the 
‘verticals’: the client-facing teams that take care, among others, of media and 
entertainment, gaming, social media networks, web hosting, e-commerce, financial 
services, healthcare, education and policing. Whilst some features vary, the underlying 
assets remain the same: the discs and servers, the datacentres and fibre optic cables, the 
field enablement portals and most platforms are standardized across all verticals.  For 
instance, AWS has 120 product teams whose work and research is leveraged across all 
sectors (Kilpatrick, interview 2019). 
In addition, size benefits global cloud providers because the technology they deploy 
is essentially borderless. Computing processes are today assisted by artificial 
intelligence and machine learning (AIML), which are applied in multiple ways to 
automate operations along the media delivery chain. AIML technology is used in asset 
management systems to tag content, search assets and add metadata. AWS’s AIML 
applications include automated picture selection, transcription and translation, and face 
recognition, a feature first tested by Sky during its coverage of the wedding of Prince 
Harry and Meghan Markle in May 2018 (Kilpatrick, interview 2019). In transmission, 
AIML is used to optimise CDN performance and scale up resources by predicting usage 
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peaks, for instance in the occurrence of live sport events and new releases (Zanni, 
2019).  Google works with DeepMind, its AIML division, to control electricity flows in 
its data centres (Google executive, interview 2019). Cognitive technology drives 
personalisation and plays a key role in the recommendation engines of broadcasters and 
platforms alike (Atkinson, 2017).  
Like all multi-sectoral suppliers, cloud providers – and their clients – reap the 
benefits of knowledge transfers and cross-fertilization: Microsoft Azure has made 
advances in latency – crucial for the media and entertainment sector - after lessons 
learnt from clients in finance, and Google Cloud from its involvement in gaming. 
Google has changed its recommendation algorithms based on its experience with retail 
customers. Conversely, AWS’s transcoding engines for video streaming, which are 
primarily used in media and entertainment, are also deployed in health and policing 
(Darnell, interview 2019; Google executive, interview 2019; Kilpatrick, interview 
2019).  
 
From global suppliers to a shared supply base 
In the space of a few decades, an activity once deemed core by broadcasters is now 
devolved to a task network that involves global suppliers.  Why outsource, why a task 
network, and why a global supply base?  
Faced with the mounting cost of upgrading technology, the need to access a 
complex video ecosystem and to serve audiences across borders, broadcasters began to 
outsource media delivery in the 2000s (Chalaby, 2019). This evolution recently 
gathered pace with the advent of IP-based transport facilitating the collaboration of 
firms in media delivery and the formation of multi-sectoral suppliers capable of 
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significant economies of scale. 
IP-based technologies have enabled the formation of a task network because the 
conversion of media files into bytes - a highly standardized commodity - has greatly 
increased the interoperability and modularity of the media delivery GVC (Sturgeon and 
Kawakami, 2010: 10). IP standards being known and agreed upon, it is easier for 
suppliers to enter the chain at a specific point, and specialize in a task or segment of 
their choice. Standards minimise the amount of knowledge firms need to exchange in 
order to interact, thereby lowering transaction costs among firms involved in the 
network. Low-cost transactions can now occur at thin crossing points which are located 
between the chain’s segments (Baldwin, 2007).  
How is specialization in a task or segment a viable business model? Media files 
have become data packets like any other, thus it makes no difference to a server or a 
router if the file it transports is a parking surveillance video or a reality TV show. This 
has made it possible for suppliers to serve the broadcasting sector with the same 
common IT stack and general-purpose equipment that they use in other industries, 
allowing them to serve a cross-sectoral customer base with the same underlying and 
generic assets.  
The formation of a media delivery GVC raises issues of power and governance 
within the chain. Lead firms are usually in charge of GVCs in which they operate. 
Fashion, for instance, is best described as a captive value chain as Western-based 
retailers yield considerable power over suppliers, which are smaller in size, have limited 
capabilities, and are scattered in low-cost developing countries (Frederick and Gereffi, 
2011). By way of contrast, media delivery is a modular chain. In this configuration, the 
arm’s length interaction between lead firms and suppliers is based on codified 
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specifications and agreed standards, and coordination and capabilities are more equally 
distributed along the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005: 86). This type of governance denotes a 
fairly low degree of power asymmetry between lead firms and suppliers (Gereffi et al., 
2005: 89). 
The concept of polarity is useful to examine the chain governance at macro-level, 
beyond and above the linkage mechanisms and power relations among its actors. Who 
drives the chain, and who determines its trajectory? Ponte and Sturgeon distinguish 
between unipolar, bipolar and multipolar chains. The first are driven by a few powerful 
actors and characterized by a high level of ‘drivenness’, while multipolar chains exhibit 
‘multiple foci of power and various kinds of linkages’ (Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014: 215). 
More research is needed to determine with certainty the polarity of the media delivery 
chain. Provisionally, it shows signs of being bipolar, its trajectory being co-defined by 
media conglomerates of tech giants. But the rise to power of tech companies who now 
co-drive this chain is remarkable. Broadcasters are no longer the innovation centres they 
used to be and even struggle to recruit high-calibre engineers who do not regard them as 
tech companies (Stevens, interview 2017). Much of the capabilities, skillset and 
innovation drive that determine the shape of the chain now rests in the hands of the 
latter. The suppliers’ rise to prominence is underlined by the strategy of the tech giants 
(e.g. YouTube, Amazon Video Prime) who have launched content arms that compete 
directly with their own media customers. 
The rise of global suppliers has three major implications: consolidation, global 
integration and industry co-evolution. The media technology sector - valued at about 
US$ 51 billion – has gone through intense rounds of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
in recent years, sharply reducing the number of operating firms (Devoncroft, 2017: 16). 
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M&A activities help firms to become leader in their chosen segment, generate 
economies of scale, and acquire global scope - a pre-requisite to serving the sector’s 
lead firms. Consolidation is accentuated by lead firms’ preference to run lean supply 
chains, and new media technology projects tend to involve two to three suppliers only 
(Devoncroft, 2017: 39). Although there is no indication that the supply market in media 
delivery is oligopolistic, these trends not only consolidate the sector but limit the ability 
of new entrants and smaller suppliers to compete in the market. Several specialist 
suppliers are struggling to survive: Deluxe Entertainment, a US-based post-production 
firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and TVT Media, a UK-based end-to-end content 
services provider, also filed for insolvency, both in October 2019. Smaller suppliers’ 
only option is to find an innovative niche and hope to attract the attention of a large 
supplier.   
Global integration has a double meaning. First, it refers to the scale of the 
companies involved. With the consolidation of the media technology sector, media 
delivery has become a chain where lead firms and their suppliers have an equally large 
footprint; it has become a multinational-to-multinational operation. Second, media 
delivery has become a global-scale production system, in the sense that the firms 
involved have developed the capability to deliver content to and from any location in 
the world on a 24/7 basis. The key beneficiaries are the leading OTT platforms that need 
to operate at scale and use this system to route content to their users irrespective of 
distance (unless prevented to do so by local regulations). Audiences benefit too as both 
the amount and diversity of content they can watch is unprecedented in history.   
There are, however, losers, including small specialist suppliers whose skillset and 
technology has become redundant, and traditional broadcasters. The latter operate 
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predominantly in national markets and have limited ability to grow. In addition, they are 
losing the battle for attention (as illustrated by the Ofcom figures, quoted above), and 
market shares in the advertising market. Some of these shares are lost to the tech giants’ 
own video services. Alphabet, Youtube’s parent company, announced a record US$ 
15.1 billion in advertising revenue for 2019 (Foster, 2019). Broadcasters are acutely 
aware of the presence of YouTube in their market and see it as a direct competitor 
(Greenaway, interview 2019). 
Finally, the television industry now shares a supply base with other sectors, leading 
to the phenomenon of industry co-evolution, which occurs when lead firms across 
different industrial sectors ‘interact with broadly shared supply bases to drive the 
evolution of entire industries’ (Sturgeon and Lee, 2005: 35). This shared supply base is 
triggering a self-reinforcing mechanism that strengthens the necessity of outsourcing 
and the strategic pre-eminence of global suppliers:  
 
Shared supply bases, as in the modular production network, tend to generate a self-reinforcing 
dynamic – a classic network effect – because pooling effects create large external economies of 
scale and scope and powerful learning effects. These learning effects induce an increasing number 
of lead firms to tap the network, which in turn further enhances the competence, scale, and scope of 
the turnkey supply base and induces more firms to participate. Thus a historical process is 
unleashed, where the development of an external supply base through outsourcing encourages 
further outsourcing, and so on (Sturgeon and Less, 2005: 45). 
 
For the television industry, the implications of a shared supply base are double 
edged. Media firms benefit from cross-sectoral research and development that brings 
costs down, allowing them to deliver more content for less. However, they have lost a 
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certain amount of control with evolving technology, and so must rely on third party 
infrastructure to deliver content.    
 
Conclusion 
The transition towards IP delivery comes with pros and cons for media firms. Streaming 
is a requirement in order to remain relevant in a fast-evolving and competitive video 
ecosystem. While it enables media firms to reach consumers directly via DTC 
platforms, broadcasters and streamers depend on the infrastructure of the tech giants in 
order to operate them. The presence of these companies in the media delivery GVC 
presents traditional businesses with a significant challenge. First, tech giants having 
realised the edge that a global infrastructure gives them, have gone on to develop their 
own video services. Second, the size asymmetry between media firms and the tech 
giants is substantial. While the market capitalization of RTL and ITV, Europe’s two 
largest commercial broadcasters, stands at 5.83 US$ billion and 4.35 US$ billion 
respectively, the three leaders in the CDN and cloud computing industries (Google’s 
parent company Alphabet, Amazon and Microsoft) are worth 990.7 US$ billion, 1.3 
US$ trillion and 1.4 US$ trillion respectively (Google Finance, 9 June 2020). In an 
industry which increasingly operates on a global basis, the benefit that scale brings 
cannot be underestimated and may be a key factor tipping the balance of power in 
favour of the tech giants.  
The future of this asymmetrical relationship, however, will no longer entirely 
depend on industrial actors. As Cunningham and Craig state, tech giants have so far 
benefitted from a laxed and lenient regulatory environment worldwide (Cunningham 
and Craig, 2019: 266). A new regulatory era is taking shape as governments are waking 
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to the vast influence that is brought to bear on societies and economies. In their home 
market, the big tech firms have been subject to ongoing inquiries as their scale and 
market power attract increasing attention from lawmakers. Alphabet itself 
acknowledges in its latest report that ‘we are subject to increasing regulatory scrutiny as 
well as changes in public policies governing a wide range of topics that may negatively 
affect our business’ (Alphabet, 2020: 15). The US Congress, various regulatory 
agencies, and several attorneys have launched investigations questioning aspects of their 
business practices, from the way they handle data to potential antitrust violations (Del 
Rey, 2020; Nicas et al., 2019; Swartz, 2020).  
In Europe, the French government will be the first to tax the local revenues of 
global tech firms, and a French minister has warned that the new tax is ‘just the tip of 
the iceberg in terms of new regulations that must be introduced internationally to deal 
with the powerful tech giants’ (Chrisafis, 2020).  
The European Commission has begun to draft a comprehensive digital strategy that 
aims to harness digital technologies in a way that protects Europe’s open societies, 
reflects their values, and benefits their businesses. It is an assertive policy drive that 
involves regulating an array of technologies (e.g. AI, online platforms), placing digital 
transformation at the heart of the foreign policy agenda, and building up Europe’s 
digital capabilities. Overall, the European Union is seeking to retain (or regain) its 
‘technological sovereignty’ by building its own ‘key capacities’  and reducing its 
‘dependency on other parts of the globe’ (European Commission, 2020: 3).  
It is an ambitious policy project which, if completed, may redraw the geographic 
boundaries of some GVCs, including media delivery. But even Ursula von der Leyen, 
the President of the European Commission, sounds a note of caution. While she states 
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her aim to achieve technological sovereignty, she acknowledges that ‘it may be too late 
to replicate hyperscalers’ (von der Leyen, 2019: 13). The merit of the EU policy, 
however, is to recognize the power that scale brings in the digital economy, and to carry 
the debate into the diplomatic arena. 
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2 More research is needed in order to describe this evolution in the United States. However, an historical episode 
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not cross the mind of TV executives today, if only because TV set manufacturing is another industry altogether. 
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4 Smaller CDN providers can form federations to help them to improve reach, latency and throughput 
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